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Abstract: Tesco withdrew from the Korean market in September 2015. The withdrawal of
Tesco has not generally been seen as being due to management failure, but, instead, as a 
strategic reallocation of resources by Tesco in the UK. Yet there may still be more to 
understand about this development. The tale of Tesco’s arrival in and departure from Korea 
has not ended. We consider the relative performance of Tesco (Homeplus) stores and those 
of rival E-Mart. We find that, in attempting to be authentically local, Tesco may have 
hampered its own long-term success in an important overseas market. In an empirical study 
we utilised the Logit model to contrast selection factors employed by local consumers in 
respect of both Tesco/Homeplus and E-Mart. Our analysis reveals that product range 
(including Private Brands), store accessibility, and convenience were the main factors on 
which consumers discriminated between these rivals. 
Introduction 
Since the pioneering work of Scott (1970) geographers have paid increasing attention to 
retailing as a major sub-sector of the Service industries. Indeed, the UK retail sector 
currently has a turnover of some £350 billion per annum and employs around 2.8 million 
workers. Increasingly, observers have noted the implications of the increased size, scale, and 
power of the top retailers. 30 years ago, Wrigley (1988) noted that retail businesses ranked 
among the largest of enterprises. WalMart of the USA is often cited as the largest private-
sector employer in the world – making retailing increasingly difficult to ignore.  
Stockmarket-listed businesses face a perpetual search for new markets in order to maintain 
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even modest growth and profit targets. This can lead to mergers or diversification or to 
ventures into overseas markets. In this paper we consider South Korea where the latter 
trends have proved to be remarkably interesting. Using an empirical technique well 
established in Britain, we seek insights on how Koreans actually use rival stores and what 
they think of them. This reveals important contrasts in local patronage between leading 
domestic retailer E-Mart and its foreign-owned rival Tesco. We detect advantages accruing to 
systems that permit local products to be locally supplied. The yet wider message is that the 
retail sector remains characterized by constant and often unpredictable change. 
Retailing and globalisation 
There is a notable literature on globalisation of businesses operations: including retail 
(Akehurst and Alexander 1996). However, it has been dominated by research on 
manufacturing: for example on Fordist versus Flexible production regimes (Burrows et al 
1992). Fordism demonstrates the longstanding tendency of manufacturers to move routine 
production overseas to lower-cost environments (Dicken 1986) and this included China after 
it joined the WTO. As noted, the service sector in its search for growth often turns not just 
to overseas sourcing but overseas selling. This is rarely uncomplicated and our interest lies  
with a particular subset of retail globalisation which links to local authenticity. So, for 
example, for many who desire an Apple i-phone it may not matter if that product was 
invented or manufactured in the USA or in China. Conversely, the Trump Presidency has 
brought to the fore the topics both of repatriation of production and of ‘genuine US 
content’. In retailing an overseas ‘flagship’ store (Nobbs et al 2012) for, say, Gucci, is not 
likely to generate controversy since it may safely be ignored by most whilst greatly 
welcomed by a privileged few consumers. 
 Apple (as with Singer Sewing machines of an earlier Century) and Gucci may quite possibly 
achieve global acceptance but other businesses can face problems – sometimes 
unanticipated. In 2018, the death in Sweden of the founder of IKEA drew attention to the 
countries where it had succeeded. These were mostly Western countries with a 
preparedness to embrace both very large stores and the concept of DIY. Yet the basic 
concept of DIY faced social/cultural resistance in Chile as Bianci (2008) discovered. We do 
not have space to cover the literature on social/cultural/ differences between countries 
(covered in Wong et al 2015). However, where such differences or ‘distances’ are small – as 
between Canada and the USA - then, as demonstrated by Arnold (1997) and Daniel and 
Hernandez (2017), it is not surprising that US mega-corporations dominate Canadian 
retailing. In some cases, as with iconic Hudson’s Bay Department stores, the locals may not 
even be aware that a landmark Department Store has fallen under foreign control (not 
uncommon: Hallsworth 1991a). Indeed many British shoppers are probably unaware that 
popular Primark is controlled by the Canadian Weston group. Here we accept the truism 
that the expansion of food/ fast-moving consumer goods retailers into overseas markets is 
most likely to be problematic. Especially if, as is typical with food, account must be taken of 
important local social/cultural/ preferences. This is where the local meets the global (Bell 
and Valentine 1997). Many local people can be affected if local suppliers of basics such as 
food are replaced by unfamiliar Western retailers: as happened in some parts of South-East 
Asia when markets were liberalised in the 1990s (Kim and Hallsworth 2013).  The most-
studied of the ‘invading’ new stores have tended to be (very) large scale grocery stores: 
though the terminology used varies. The three most prominent operators of such stores are 
WalMart (supercenters) Tesco (superstores) and Carrefour (hypermarkets). That said, 
WalMart entered Canada by buying Woolco with its smaller ‘discount’ format stores and the 
UK by purchasing existing operator ASDA. In fact, all three firms currently operate from 
formats of different sizes – most notably Tesco. Our concern here is with the very largest 
stores and, as there are no accepted store type definitions, we adopt the terminology 
(above) that the retailers themselves use. Also, for all three retail chains, diversification into 
overseas markets has involved a mixture of successes and failures. For example, WalMart 
entered and soon left Germany – where Gerhard and Hahn (2005) found that locals 
preferred familiar products offered by ALDI. Also, Carrefour entered and left England and 
Wales and Tesco entered and left the USA. One country that was a target for all three is 
South Korea. South Korea is an attractive case study since the criticism that retailing is 
under-theorised has been addressed by retail-based research in Korea. As in many such 
‘host’ countries, the received wisdom was that superstores or hypermarkets were a 
successful ‘Western’ format that would probably overwhelm local rivals leading to instant 
and profitable, success. The experience of WalMart and Carrefour in South Korea, however, 
was one of very rapid failure. The details of how that came to be the case for those two big 
players, but not the third, Tesco, is what concerned researchers. 
 
Tesco in Korea: Are you local? 
For reasons thoroughly analysed (Coe and Lee 2006, 2013; Coe and Wrigley 2009, 2017 ; 
Wood Coe and Wrigley 2016; Coe Lee and Wood 2017) Tesco thrived in Korea by adopting 
‘Glocalisation’– globalizing activities whilst attempting to be as ‘Korean’ as possible in their 
actions. Their signal contribution was that Tesco had become ‘embedded’ in a way that 
WalMart and Carrefour had not. Whereas their rivals imposed their elsewhere-successful 
formats upon Korea, Tesco acted more subtly. Their efforts towards embeddeness  may  
explain why Tesco left Korea only after a much longer and more impactful stay. 
Embeddeness/ Glocalisation led Tesco to team with powerful Samsung, to use the name 
Homeplus rather than Tesco, and to employ a Korean Chief Executive. That said, he later 
went on to court controversy in a rather un-Korean manner as did his successor in 2013 (Coe 
et al 2017). This is not irrelevant in that it openly revealed that Homeplus was a Tesco 
operation and not truly Korean as many may have thought. That said, Homeplus appeared to 
assert Korean cultural values by devoting space to Community and educational uses. Yet, in 
2015, Tesco sold off its Korean operations to local investors. Coe et al (2017) argue that Tesco 
was responding to domestic tribulations in the UK and sold its Korean business in order to 
offset substantial trading losses at home: a view with which we concur. 
 
Here we focus on the aspects of the Korean context (see also Pattnaik and Lee 2013) to 
which Coe et al (2017) alluded by identifying several local difficulties suggesting that Tesco 
may not have been an entirely unwilling vendor. They faced rising Unionisation and 
regulatory reform and the reaction of established powerful rivals notably E-Mart. Clearly 
there was pressure opposing Tesco – a  mindset largely discouraged in Europe by EU pro-
integration mindsets. Their stability disrupted Korean rivals responded to Homeplus. Note 
that Ekinsmyth et al (1995) discussed both embeddedness and stability whilst calling for 
Geographers to undertake more study of how powerful businesses behave. Here we will 
look at how Tesco and its major Korean rival E-Mart performed as direct competitors. 
 
A related point is this: did the provenance of some Homeplus stores influence how they 
were used? Though Tesco grew steadily, they did not build every single store from the 
ground up – some stores were acquired from the failed Carrefour venture. Were they over-
sized for Tesco’s later purposes? Maybe so, given the Community uses to which apparently-
surplus floorspace was put. Whatever, Tesco entered the Korean market with a fifty-fifty 
joint venture with Samsung C&T Corporation in 1999. As above, Tesco made substantial 
efforts at (g)localization via joint investment rather than attempting direct entry: the process 
that, in Korea, failed for Carrefour and Wal-Mart. As a result, Tesco Homeplus achieved good 
trading performance for 15 years and became competitive enough to challenge the industry 
leader, E-mart. Tesco/Homeplus grew (see also Table 3 in Coe et al 2017) from two stores in 
1999, to 141 and staff numbers increased from 800 to 26,000 – becoming Korea’s second 
largest retail corporation – wholly owned by Tesco by 2011. We cover the Korean retail 
market in the next section. Yet Tesco eventually sold out to Korean private equity fund, MBK 
partners – but that still leaves the topic of how consumers actually responded to 
Tesco/Homeplus. This moves away from analysis of the investment/divestment process 
focused on to structural and legal obstacles, localization strategy, difficulties in the entry 
process, etc. Indeed, behavioural factors/local preferences have often been under-played 
(see Goldman et al 1999). 
 
Retail change in Korea  
Korean retailers faced major changes after the opening of the distribution market in 1996. 
Subsequently, as confirmed by Coe et al (2017), both the number and sales volumes of small 
and medium sized businesses (notably traditional retail markets) in Korea decreased rapidly 
at the expense of what Koreans call Super-Supermarkets (SSMs). Internet, TV and home 
shopping all showed sales increases as the system restructured – probably with largely 
‘invisible’ job losses in traditional store sectors. This is not irrelevant since, in Britain, Tesco 
and others portray new store openings as creators of (usually 300) ‘new’ jobs and thus 
inherently beneficial. Some suggest that, in the present economic climate in the UK, Tesco 
have actually shed 10,000 jobs since current CEO Lewis took over. Back in Korea, overall sales 
of retail businesses showed a gradual increase: from 143 billion US dollars in 2007 to 215 
billion US dollars in 2011(Korea Statistics, 2013). The largest stores comprised some 17% of 
the total retail industry with around 36.4billion (US $) as of 2011 (Korea Statistics, 2013). 
Table 1 Sales volumes of Retail Business in Korea by format (2005-2011) 
(Unit: billion $US) 
 2005  2006  2007  2008  2009  2010  2011  
Traditional Market 23.6 21.6 19.5 19.3 19.1 18.5 18.2 
Large Discount 
Store 
20.5 22.9 25.8 27.6 28.8 27.2 31.1 
Department Store 15.1 10.6 11.5 12.1 13.2 13.8 14.4 
Super Market 
(Super-Super 
Market) 
16.4 
(1.9) 
16.8 
(2.0) 
18.5 
(2.3) 
20.9 
(3.0) 
23.2 
(3.6) 
26.3 
(4.3) 
29.0 
(5.3) 
Convenience Store 3.1 4.1 4.8 5.7 6.3 6.8 7.9 
Non-Store Retailing 13.2 12.3 12.4 12.8 13.9 19.6 22.1 
Source: Korea Statistics (2013), SMBA (2012), Korea Chain Store Association (2011). 
 
As of 2011, the Big 3 large store operators in Korea (E-mart, Homeplus, and Lotte Mart) had 
total sales of around 25.3 billion US dollars and around 86.6% of the market (SMBA, 2012; 
http://store.emart.com, http://corporate.homeplus.co.kr). Contextually, as of December 
2013, there were a total of 136 Homeplus locations and the average size of the shops was 
38,507m². E-mart, had 146 locations with an average shop area of 10,300m² (The Yearbook 
of Retail Industry, 2013). According to the Korea Statistics Office (http://kostat.go.kr), the 
sales, as of December 2016, for the two corporations were 13 billion US dollars for E-Mart 
and 6.8 billion US dollars for Homeplus. 
 
Prior Research on inter-store competition  
One prominent use of applied geography has been to employ large databases and 
geodemographics to improve location planning for new stores. Such expertise has been a 
key driver of the growth in market share held by the largest – most-professional - retailers. 
Geographers, both in University Geography Departments (eg GMAP at Leeds) or in Research 
Institutes founded by Geographers (eg IRS, Stirling University, OXIRM, Oxford, CSCA, Toronto) 
are central to this process. Informed by store location geographers, UK Tesco stands out for 
its use of geodemographics to assist in building the right size of store in the best location. 
However we have noted that in Korea Tesco acquired some stores that were sub-optimal: for 
example, one is ’embedded’ in the 2002 World Cup Stadium. 
 
Coe et al have researched how Tesco entered Korea whereas we consider at-store 
performance – how Koreans reacted to Tesco – by comparing rival store attributes such as 
location, and consumer preference criteria. Indeed Wrigley, who has researched retail 
internationalization (eg Durand & Wrigley, 2009) has also turned to detailed analysis of more 
micro-locational issues (see Wrigley and Dolega 2011). Store-based ‘impact’ factors that are 
frequently found to be important include product price and quality (Arnold, 1997). 
Accessibility, too, is significant but may be under-estimated once the store choice decision is 
made (Hallsworth 1991b) while Kim and Kim (2013) show that Korea’s traditional retail 
formats need better accessibility in order to remain competitive. Convenience is very 
significant: consumers even stress convenience as a factor when shopping online. We do not 
pursue online shopping but note that Coe et al (2017) identify this, too, as a pressure on 
Tesco in Korea. So, attributes such as convenience but also store layout, facilities, and the 
general physical environment are regularly identified as important. 
 
Research method 
We wished to discover more about the impact of the Tesco-owned Homeplus stores trading 
in Korea. The topic of Impact Studies was a theme at the British Geographers’ Annual 
Conference as long ago as 1981. Utilising variables identified in past research, data were 
collected through a questionnaire – the familiar survey of shopping patterns often 
undertaken by market research companies. We surveyed residents of Korea’s two main 
capital regions (Seoul and Kyeonggi) where around half of Korea’s domestic population 
resides. We contrasted reactions to, and usage of, rival stores run by E-mart (78) and 
Homeplus (63). The survey process collected 209 and 212 questionnaires in Gangseogu, 
Seoul and Euijeongbu, Kyeongido respectively and was conducted between April 10 and 
April 2015, through a random sample of people aged over 20 years and by employing a 
professional research corporation. A total of 421 usable responses were obtained. The 
questionnaires took store ownership (E-mart or Homeplus) as the dichotomized dependent 
variable and demographic characteristics were used as independent variables. We also 
recoded average monthly number of store visits, monthly average purchase amount and 
selective attributes of these large stores. Essentially, we wanted to know how, and 
especially why, one chain might be preferred to the other. 
 
Model 
Akinci, Kaynak, Atklgan & Aksoy (2007 p 538) see logistic regression as a relevant 
technique ”…for modeling and discrimination problems in marketing. Since it has alternative 
data distribution assumptions, it generates more appropriate findings in terms of model fit 
and the correctness of the analysis”. Accordingly, the Logit model was chosen from among 
the non-linear regression models in which the dependent variables have bivariate 
characteristics. The binary Logit model is represented as 
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standard logistic probability distribution function. In this study, since the dependent variable 
is whether the consumer did/did not choose a store, the binomial logistic regression analysis 
is an appropriate statistical estimation technique. Essentially, the object variables are 0 
(Homeplus) and 1 (E-mart), and the prediction value is 0 or 1. 
 
Data Analysis 
The general characteristics of the sample responses to the survey are listed in table 2 and 
are as follows. 212 people (50.4%) preferred E-Mart and on average they visited 3.45 times 
per month. The average purchase amount per visit was 43,100 won (37.5 dollars US). 
Regarding gender, the majority were females: 298 (70.8%) and there were 338 married 
people (80.3%). There were 234 people under 30 (55.6%), while the number of people over 
40 years old was 187 (44.4%). Regarding the average monthly income per family, there were 
184 people with an income of under $3,636 (43.8%). 
Table2 Description of derived Variables 
Division Frequency/Mean Ratio(%)/Std. 
Mall 
E-mart = 1 212 50.4 
Homeplus = 0 209 49.6 
Frequency of visit per Month 3.45 2.81 
Purchase amount per visit 4.31 0.99 
Gender 
Men=1 123 29.2 
Women = 0 298 70.8 
Marital Status 
Married = 1 338 80.3 
Unmarried 83 19.7 
Age 
20–30 = 1 80 19.0 
31–40 = 2 154 36.6 
41–50 = 3 125 29.7 
51–60 = 4 53 12.6 
60 and greater = 5 9 2.1 
Monthly income/per 
household ($US) 
Under 909 = 1 2 0.5 
910–1,818 = 2 15 3.6 
1,819–2,727 = 3 53 12.6 
2,728–3,636 = 4 114 27.1 
3,637 and greater = 5 237 56.3 
 
Though we had derived some key basic statistics (Table 2 and descriptions) that began to 
show some performance differences between Homeplus and Tesco, we also wished to know 
what were the basic criteria on which Koreans were judging these rivals. Hence we first 
turned to a Principal Components factor analysis (PCA) of scores on our selected attributes 
generated by the competing ‘local’ (E-mart) and ‘foreign’ (Homeplus) corporations in Korea. 
This, shown in Table 3, closely replicates work in Hallsworth (1988 p 80). The core advantage 
of this to the later statistical analysis is that the three derived PCA factors should be 
statistically independent and thus particularly suitable for regression analysis. They also 
provide valuable insights in their own right. An initial exploratory factor analysis was 
subjected to Varimax rotation (to maximise distinctive dimensions) and, from 21 individual 
variables, three distinct factors with an Eigenvalue greater than one emerged  - with 
cumulative variance of around 65% and Cronbach α coefficients all over 0.6. As is common 
with PCA, it is important that the variables grouped into ‘factors’ or ‘components’ do 
actually make sense and can viably be given an understandable label. The first and most 
significant derived factor, with over 33% of variance explained, we labelled “product”: 
Zeithaml, (1988 p3) argues that "Perceived quality can be defined as the consumer's 
judgement about a product's overall excellence or superiority". This crucial “product” factor 
comprised 3 variables: ‘product price’, ‘product excellence’, and ‘product reliability’. The 
second derived factor we labelled “convenience” and it is formed of four variables: 
‘convenient return and refund’, ‘convenient payment means’, ‘well-equipped rest facility’ 
and ‘convenient transportation’. The third factor we labelled “accessibility”: composed of 
‘road convenience’ and ‘closeness to home’. The major implication of this part of the study 
was that we would need to pay particular attention to the products that were for sale at 
these two rivals. It does also confirm that many of the evaluative criteria work as well in 
Korea as in Britain – though we also needed to dig a little deeper. 
Table3 Principal Components analysis  
 Cronbach’s α Eigenvalue Factor loading Variance 
Product 
(Factor 1) 
Product Price .755 2.986 .831 33.175 
Product Excellence .803 
Product Reliability .788 
Convenience 
(Factor 2) 
 
convenient payment .659 1.742 .835. 19.356 
convenient return and 
refund 
.825 
convenient transportation ..488 
Well-equipped rest facility  .408 
Accessibility 
(Factor 3) 
road convenience .640 1.151 .911 12.785 
closeness to home .896 
Cumulative variance= 65.315 
 
Analysis of store performance Results  
As noted, the Logit model was also used for the empirical analysis of reported behaviours 
(see Table 4). The criteria influencing consumers’ choice of store between E-Mart and 
Homeplus, were evaluated by local people on criteria that reflected their preferences and 
motivations. Importantly, we found that consumers preferring E-mart made larger purchases 
per visit than those at Homeplus. By calculating shop size against sales, daily averages can be 
calculated. They show Homeplus at 38,279 Korean won (38 US dollars) and E-mart at 49,500 
Korean won (49.5 US dollars) per day. Perusal of both The Year Book of Distribution (2016) 
and documents produced by E-mart and Homeplus show a consistent pattern whereby 
Homeplus stores, of which there are slightly fewer than E-mart, are larger (typically by 
almost 100%) but have lower sales densities. However, our first concern is with the 
evaluations that drove the spending patterns – an aspect hitherto under-emphasised. 
Homeplus built or acquired larger stores that soon accommodated non-sales facilities 
such as ‘life time education centers’, beauty shops, medical centers, coffee shops, banks, 
restaurants, customer rest rooms etc. : this affected store sales densities. We re-emphasise 
that Factor 1 in our analysis indicated that store products were the prime evaluative factor 
(see again Gerhard and Hahn 2005) even though E-Mart patrons also displayed generally 
higher satisfaction levels regarding convenience and accessibility. At E-mart, products were 
seen as more authentically Korean and the Korean food shopper is well educated on quality 
and authenticity. Wong et al (2015) confirmed this when interviewing Korean immigrants to 
Vancouver, Canada. Their respondents discriminated between rival Korean-owned food 
chains and proactively sought out the most authentic. 
 
Table 4 Results of the model analysis 
Section β S.E. Wald Sig. Exp(β) 
Gender 0.209 0.227 0.843 .359 0.812 
marry -0.272 0.277 0.968 .325 1.313 
Income 0.035 0.096 0.129 .720 0.966 
Frequency visit 0.020 0.044 0.211 .646 0.980 
Purchase 
amount 
0.540 0.134 16.310 .000*** 0.583 
Fac1 0.223 0.105 4.517 .034** 0.800 
Fac2 -0.287 0.107 7.141 .008*** 1.332 
Fac3 -0.234 0.108 4.661 .031** 1.264 
Constant -2.570 0.867 8.782 .003*** 13.061 
model χ2= 39.536, -2LL=541.262***, % of Right prediction=62.1% 
*, **, *** indicates values at the 10%, 5%, and 1% significance levels, respectively 
 
As noted previously, and based on the recorded significance levels shown in Table 4, we find 
that the model identifies the Purchase amount per trip to be a key discriminatory factor 
between our rivals – alongside the three ‘independent’ PCA-derived factors. Conversely, 
Gender or marital status did not appear to be crucial factors. From our earlier PCA, Factor 1 
related to products and product quality and we decided to pursue this aspect further. Based 
on additional locally-derived insights, we found that shoppers discriminated not just on 
product quality/reliability but expressly on features of corporate Private Brands (PB). This is 
in line with studies by the Korea Consumer Agency. Overall product satisfaction cannot be 
ignored and simply to stress local sourcing (inevitable with fresh and perishable foodstuffs) is 
insufficient. It does, however, mirror the success in the UK of Aldi and Lidl which focus on 
price-driven PBs. In Korea, possibly reflecting sub-prime, it was through the purchase of PB 
products that price competitiveness (Ody 1987) emerged as a main factor and E-Mart was 
superior to Homeplus. Furthermore, E-Mart (15 brands, 18,000 items) also had more PB 
products than Homeplus (11 brands and 15,850 items). Therefore, product-related factors, 
notably price and quality, drove competitive superiority for E-Mart; the local corporation. 
 
A note on local product supply 
Learning from the consumer preference results has, inevitably, been our core focus but a 
further key topic is distribution. A major domestic strength for Tesco UK is the efficiency of 
its Regional Distribution Centres (RDCs). Indeed, most major UK chains moved towards 
Regional Distribution Centres and away from allowing local managers the discretion of local 
sourcing. However, it seems that Koreans prefer to ‘stay local’ and even PB products are 
delivered to large stores such as E-Mart. Inbound TNCs that are used to using RDCs need to 
consider how they might create relationships that allow them to source more products 
locally. Indeed, ALDI and Lidl did something similar in the UK. When the leading UK retailers 
were criticized for exploiting smaller suppliers, notably farmers, they vowed to treat such 
suppliers better – hardly a way to lose public sympathy. Indeed, Aldi persistently top-
performs on Grocery Supply Code criteria in the UK. We also found that E-Mart generated 
higher sales per square metre from their stores than did Homeplus – a recognized truism 
that turned out to be, as in the UK, rather important. As UK superstores scramble to use 
surplus and under-performing space, in Korea, some such Homeplus space was used for the 
community facilities that were initially intended to make Tesco appear authentically Korean. 
Note that, as in Korea, over-szed stores are not favoured in Britain. Koreans evidently remain 
very sensitive to the value and reliability of products. Their default position is familiarity – 
but also authenticity.  As with Wal-Mart in Germany. unfamiliar products imported by TNCs 
from overseas leave local consumers 100% reliant on trust in the retailer’s judgement. 
Meanwhile, ALDI and Lidl in the UK overcame the ‘tyranny of choice’ (Elms et al 2016) of the 
vast hypermarket format with their smaller stores focusing on a narrow but keenly-priced 
range. Geographers Steve Wood and Jonathan Reynolds (2012)  reveal analysis that can 
offer insights on the performance of now-popul ar smaller stores. 
 
Conclusions 
We concur with Coe, Lee and Wood (2017) that Tesco primarily withdrew from Korea in 
September 2015 due to domestic UK pressures. However, even though Homeplus is now re-
localised, we have learned new insights on store performance: based on the ‘impact’ 
technique long familiar to retail geographers in Britain. It is satisfying that many of the 
evaluative criteria used in our survey worked as well in Korea as in Britain. Tesco’s Korean 
experience allowed us to dig a little deeper and to examine impact factors that are not often 
covered in overseas markets. Arguably, TNCs entering similar overseas markets must make 
substantial adjustments to their standard operating model in order to be considered truly 
‘local’ – and all retailers must constantly monitor their customers. As we have based our 
findings on a consumer questionnaire undertaken before Tesco UK sold Homeplus in 
September 2015, we encourage more consumer behaviour research. This approach is in line 
with the growing emphasis on ‘behavioural economics’ that has brought recent Nobel Prizes 
to both Kahneman and Thaler. The wider issue for retail geographers is, as noted in the 
Introduction, that the retail sector is characterized by constant change. This is not least 
because the global scene itself is constantly changing: often influenced by unpredictable 
events such as Sub-prime, Brexit or the US Presidential election. Such factors disturb pre-
existing assumptions about how people may behave – including how they shop and what 
they buy. In contemporary Britain, price-focused retailers such as Aldi and Lidl are thriving in 
a country where change has brought considerable uncertainty. 
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